The best developed formulation of quantum theory for a closed system that handles multipletime statements is the consistent (or decoherent) histories approach. One of the weaknesses of the approach is that it gives rise to many different consistent sets, and it has been argued that a complete interpretation should be accompanied with a natural mechanism leading to a (possibly) unique preferred consistent set. What makes even more problematic the existence of multiple consistent sets, is that it allows for the existence of contrary inferences [1] . We analyse the conceptual difficulties that arise from the existence of multiple consistent sets and provide a suggestion for a natural set selection criterion. This criterion does not lead to a unique physical consistent set, however it evades the existence of consistent sets with contrary inferences. The criterion is based on the concept of preclusion and the requirement that probability one propositions and their inferences should be non-contextual. It is also compatible with the ontology of coevents, which is an alternative histories based formulation [2] [3] [4] .
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I. INTRODUCTION
The construction of a theory of quantum gravity can be considered as the greatest challenge of modern physics. Among a great number of researchers it is believed that better understanding or a new formulation of quantum theory could prove to be fruitful in the search for quantum gravity. In the same time, issues and ideas from research in quantum gravity could provide guiding principles for researchers in quantum foundations.
Histories (or path integrals) formulations of quantum theory, seem to be more natural than other formulations from a quantum gravity perspective for two reasons. Firstly, space and time in general relativity appear in the same footing and a formulation of quantum theory that respects this would be desirable. Path integral formulations therefore, suit better with the spacetime nature of relativity. Secondly, they can be casted in an observer independent way. Quantum cosmology is the archetypical example of a closed system and an observer independent formulation is necessary to reason about such a system.
It can be argued, that quantum gravity indicates to quantum foundations to seek for histories based formulation. However, giving an observer independent interpretation of histories is not trivial. The best developed such approach is the consistent histories [5] [6] [7] [8] . Consistent histories have received several critical opinions [1, [9] [10] [11] and it is understood that the formalism needs further additions to appear as a complete viable alternative. Other attempts for a histories formulation include the quantum measure theory [12, 13] and the development that followed those papers leading to the coevents formulation [2] [3] [4] . In this paper we will reexamine the most striking conceptual problem that stems from the consistent histories formalism, namely the existence of multiple (possibly incompatible) consistent sets, and suggest a possible solution.
We will first examine the concept of contextuality and probabilities in view of realist interpretations of standard quantum theory in section II. Then briefly review the consistent histories approach in section III. In section IV we will review how contrary inferences appear in consistent histories and give an alternative perspective using the concept of zero covers which captures better the conceptual problems that arise from contrary inferences. We will give two examples of zero covers in section V. In section VI we will give the proposed set selection criterion using the concept of preclusive consistent set. In section VII we will introduce the concept of coevents and confirm that the criterion suggested is compatible with this ontology. The examples will be reexamined at section VIII and we conclude in section IX.
II. CONTEXUTALITY AND PROBABILITIES
Standard quantum theory has been proven to be contextual by the theorems of Gleason [14] and Kochen and Specker [15] . However, this does not rule out ontological (hidden variables) models, provided they have this property. The de Broglie-Bohm theory [17] provides an example of Contextual Hidden Variables Theory (CHVT). CHVT are generally classified in two types depending on how the different contexts are determined [16] . First are the environmental CHVT, where the context is determined for example, from the specific apparatus or environment that is realised. Of this type is the de Broglie-Bohm theory. Second are the algebraic CHVT, where the possible contexts are maximal Boolean sub-algebras of projection operators [18] .
In a contextual model, to use logical inferences one should be restricted at one particular context. If one has two propositions for which there does not exist any context containing both of them, then these two propositions cannot be compared or appear in the same logical inference. So far, as it is typically done, we have treated the properties corresponding to propositions and the possible contexts, independently of the dynamics of the theory. This position has been challenged recently by Sorkin [19] where he views logic as a dynamical entity. Before proceeding further, we should make some remarks about probabilities and their interpretation.
Interpreting the concept of probabilities has been an issue of debate since the early discussions of the founders of probability theory. It is outside the scope of this paper to delve in depth in this question. Here we will take the view that probabilities in general are epistemic in so far they concern with the knowledge (that an agent has) about the (ontic states of the) system. However, probability one or probability zero statements have a very different nature. As Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen stated in [20] "If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity". In other words, those type of propositions have ontic nature since they represent "an element of physical reality" of the system.
We now return to the logical structure and inferences one can make. The most important law of inference in order to reason deductively about a (possibly quantum) system is the Modus Ponens. It states that if A → B and A is true, then B is also true. Strictly speaking this and any other inference law should be applied to propositions that exist within a single (specified) context. However, if the statements in question are ontic in nature, as is the case with probability one propositions, then the truth values and the inferences derived by them should not depend on the context. This is reflected by the fact that in all CHVT the following three properties hold for the truth values that probability one and zero statements attain. Let a proposition S be such that its probability is one p(S) = 1 which also implies that p(¬S) = 0.
1. All contexts that include the proposition S, give truth value v(S) = True.
2. All contexts that include the negation of S, i.e. ¬S, give the truth value v(¬S) = False.
If S ⊆ S
′ then all contexts that include S ′ , give truth value v(S ′ ) = True.
The importance of these conditions are in order to be able to use logical inferences. The first two imply that one can use "Modus Tollens" which is essential for proofs by contradiction, while the first and third imply that one can use "Modus Ponens" which is essential for deductive proofs. Those three properties, if we accept that probability one and zero statements are ontic, appear necessary to maintain a (contextual) realist view. The truth values of certain properties may vary depending on the context but this should not include properties that occur with certainty and are therefore elements of the reality. To sum up: (i) Physical predictions are separated to "ontological predictions" (probability one and zero) and "epistemic predictions". (ii) Statements and inferences involving ontological predictions should be context-independent, as is the case in standard quantum theory. As we will see in consistent histories if one does not supplement the formalism with some extra criteria, the third property is not satisfied.
Before proceeding further, we should give some definitions here. Assume we have propositions with corresponding projection operators P and Q, corresponding to projections at one moment of time 1 . If [P, Q] = 0 they are called complementary. If they are orthogonal and add to the identity, i.e. P = 1 − Q, and P Q = QP = 0 they are called contradictory. Finally, two propositions are called contrary if they are orthogonal and not contradictory so that P < 1 − Q and P Q = QP = 0. A contrary inference is defined to be, when two contrary propositions are both implied with probability one. This is not possible at classical logic. In a contextual logic it is possible in principle to have contrary inferences, provided there does not exist any context containing both propositions. However, in standard quantum theory (and quantum logic), contrary inferences do not exist.
III. CONSISTENT HISTORIES FORMALISM
Consistent histories (or else decoherent histories) is an approach introduced by Griffiths, Omnes and Gell-Mann and Hartle ( [5] [6] [7] [8] ). The central aim of consistent histories is to assign probabilities to (coarse-grained) histories of a closed quantum system. Here we will give a brief review where the reader is referred to the original papers for further details.
In histories formulations the central mathematical structure of interest, is the histories space Ω, the space of all finest grained descriptions 2 . It is the set of all possible histories, and each element of it h i ∈ Ω corresponds to a full description of the system, specifying every detail and property. For example, a fine grained history gives the exact position of the system along with the specification of any internal degree of freedom, for every moment of time.
To each history, using the Feynman path integral we can assign a complex number (amplitude). This amplitude, depends on the initial state and on the dynamics of the system encoded in the action S:
Using this amplitude one can recover the transition amplitudes from (x 1 , t 1 ) to (x 2 , t 2 ) by summing through all the paths P obeying the initial and final condition:
The mod square of this amplitude is the transition probability. To measure the interference between histories we define the decoherence functional using the Feynman amplitudes Eq. (1):
Where A and B are any subsets of Ω, t f is the final while t 0 the initial moment of time considered and ρ the initial state. The decoherence functional obeys the following conditions:
The decoherence functional can also be defined using time ordered strings of projection operators. In particular
Where C A and C B are the class operators, which are strings of time ordered projection operators corresponding to the histories A and B respectively that we will specify below and is defined in the following way.
Here U (t) is the unitary evolution operator that relates to the Hamiltonian via U (t) = exp(−iHt), and P Ai is the subspace that history A lied at time t i . The history A is the subset of Ω that contains all the histories that the system lies in the subspace that P A1 projects to, at time t 1 and in the subspace that P A2 projects to, at time t 2 , etc. The projection operators in general can be at any subspace of the Hilbert space. Note that the expression for the class operator, is precisely the one used in ordinary quantum mechanics to obtain the amplitude, if some external observer carried out those measurements at the given times. By the linearity property of the decoherence functional Eq. (4) can be extended to subsets of Ω that are not just strings of projection operators and are called inhomogeneous histories. We are not going into deeper discussion of the differences of those two definitions and their interpretational consequences.
From the positivity condition, we can see that the diagonal elements of the decoherence functional are non-negative. Those terms are also referred to, as quantum measure ( [12, 13] ) and are labelled as µ(A) := D(A, A). The quantum measure cannot be interpreted as probability because due to interference, the additivity condition of probabilities fails:
The question of assigning probabilities to histories can now be rephrased in the following way. When is it possible to assign the quantum measure of a set of histories A as the probability of this set A actually occurring. The general aim of the approach is to be able to reason about a closed system with no reference to observer or an a-priori distinction of microscopic and macroscopic degrees of freedom, or a distinction between quantum and classical systems. In order to make the quantum measure into a proper classical measure, one needs to restrict attention to some particular collection of subsets of Ω rather than the full collection of all possible subsets of Ω. The failure to satisfy the additivity condition can be traced at the off-diagonal terms of the decoherence functional as one can see from the very definition 5 . Let us take a partition of Ω which is defined to be a collection of subsets
We call each subset A j i of a partition P j as a cell of this partition. The superscript labels the partition considered, while the subscript labels the different cells of one partition. If for any pair of cells of one partition
then the partition is called a Consistent Set (CS). For this partition and any further coarse-graining, the standard rules of probability theory hold. The quantum measure, when restricted to those questions, becomes a classical measure. One would be tempted to assign these probabilities to the coarse-grained histories of the partition. However, one can consider other partitions, say
It is possible that this partition also forms a consistent set obeying Eq. (7). More importantly there does not exist, one finest-grained consistent set, that all other consistent sets arise as further coarse-grainings. The existence of multiple CS give rise to the following two problems.
The first problem is which CS to choose in order to make predictions. The probability rules apply to each CS separately so it is not possible to compare histories that belong to different CSs. Without any further specification, one is forced in a contextual view of consistent histories, where each CS represents a different context. It is important to note here again, that since the set of possible CS (i.e. of contexts) depends on the initial conditions and dynamics of the system, the structure of the logic is also dynamical. The logical structure of such contextual view has been analysed using Topos theory by Isham [21] and subsequently by Flori [22] . However, to make sense of such contextual-logic we need a suitable interpretation. It needs to be compatible with the physical requirements that a logical structure representing a physical system should obey. This leads to the second problem. Are the different CS compatible with each other in that the physical (ontological) predictions that they make do not lead to contradiction?
Because of these issues, it has been argued that a complete interpretation of consistent histories should be accompanied with some principle that selects a, possibly unique, consistent set. In particular, the principle should at the very least address the second problem. In other words, if it does not provide a unique preferred CS, it should at least restrict the possible CSs in such a way that the remaining CSs are compatible with each other. This would (at least) allow for a realist albeit contextual view. The issue of a set selection criterion has been discussed already in the literature and one can identify two types of criteria. First are the criteria that are based on some physical principle (e.g. thermodynamic considerations) or induced by the environment [23] [24] [25] . Second are criteria that are based on the internal consistency of the logical structure (with respect to the physical predictions) (e.g. [26] ). The criterion we will introduce in this paper is of the second type.
IV. CONTRARY INFERENCES IN CONSISTENT HISTORIES AND ZERO COVERS
In consistent histories, it is possible to have two contrary propositions P, Q for a given moment of time t and two consistent sets C 1 and C 2 such that C 1 = {h P = P at time t, h ¬P = ¬P at time t} where µ(h P ) = 1, µ(h ¬P ) = 0 C 2 = {h Q = Q at time t, h ¬Q = ¬Q at timet} where µ(h Q ) = 1, µ(h ¬Q ) = 0
In other words, in consistent histories there exist contrary inferences. Note however, that there does not exist any CS (context) that includes both h P and h Q . We will give an example of contrary inference in consistent histories later.
A very important observation is that h ¬P ∩ h ¬Q = Ω, i.e. that the union of the negations of histories corresponding to contrary propositions, is the full histories space Ω, i.e. these two histories generate an (overlapping) cover of Ω. Moreover, each of these two histories have quantum measure zero. This is a very specific example of what is called a zero cover. It is defined to be a collection of histories that their union is Ω and each of these histories of the collection has quantum measure zero. For classical probability measures, no zero covers can possibly exist. However, for a quantum measure it is possible. Most of the conceptual problems in interpreting histories formulations arise due to this property. For example, the Kochen Specker theorem constitutes an example of a zero cover [27, 28] .
Here we should stress the importance of quantum measure zero histories for consistent histories. Let a history Z have quantum measure zero µ(Z) = 0. It is a property of the decoherence functional and thus of the quantum measure, that the negation of a quantum measure zero history µ(Z) = 0 has quantum measure one µ(¬Z) = 1 and moreover the partition of Ω consisting of these two histories {Z, ¬Z} forms a CS. In other words, all quantum measure zero sets are contained to at least one CS. It is interesting to note however, that this not the case for quantum measure one histories, since there exist many such histories that do not belong to any CS 6 .
V. EXAMPLES OF ZERO COVERS
We will give two examples of zero covers. The first example is a three-slit experiment while the second is the "two-site hopper". For each example we will see the zero covers and what CSs exist. Only the first example contains a contrary inference but we give both for exploring the connection with coevents as it will become apparent later.
A. Three slit
Consider a set up, where we send a photon through a plate with three slits A, B and C, and we consider (by post-selecting) a point on the final screen P , where the amplitude to go through slit A or C to P is +1, while the amplitude to reach this point through slit B is −1. In other words we have α(AP ) = α(CP ) = 1 and α(BP ) = −1. We can see that µ(AP = µ(BP ) = µ(CP ) = 1. Moreover, we have the following sets that have zero quantum measure µ({AP, BP }) = µ(BP, CP ) = 0 and generate a zero cover
For these amplitudes, one can see that there are three different consistent set. It follows that C 1 and C 2 contain contrary propositions with probability one. In C 1 , the history {CP } has probability one, while in C 2 the history {AP } which is contrary to {CP }, also has probability one. Intuitively, the one CS gives the particle crossing through slit C with probability one, while the second CS gives the particle crossing slit A with probability one. Moreover in the latter case the set {BP, CP } which incudes CP has probability zero.
B. Two-site hopper
Here we consider a system that is known as the two-site hopper [29] . We have a single system, jumping between two sites 0, 1. The evolution of the system is given by
In other words, the amplitude for the system to remain at the same site is 1/ √ 2 while to jump to the other site i/ √ 2. Here we will consider the case of three moments of time, i.e. the state starts from site 0, then we evolve it three times and therefore has 2 3 = 8 histories. Note that this equivalent with considering a qubit that one "observes" at three consecutive moments of time at a fixed basis. We will use the following labeling of the histories (outcomes from right to left):
Note, that to compute the quantum measure one needs to take into account the δ-function that exists in the decoherence functional at the final time. We can easily see that the following collection of sets covers the full history space Ω and each of them has quantum measure zero
There are more quantum measure zero sets, generated by disjoint unions of the above mentioned sets.
None of them has more than four (fine grained) histories. As we have mentioned earlier, in order to have contrary inferences one needs a two (coarse-grained) histories zero cover. It follows that in this example there are no contrary inferences, even though there is a zero cover. We can explicitly find the possible consistent sets. In particular, each measure zero set generates a two histories CS. Furthermore there are many other CSs such as
In total there are 43 different CSs (including CSs that arise as coarse-graining of other CSs).
VI. SELECTION CRITERION: PRECLUSIVE CONSISTENT SETS
To make sure that contrary inferences do not occur we should forbid the situation where a coarse-grained history that belongs to an allowed CS and has probability one, is contained in a quantum measure zero history. The above condition appears natural since, as argued in section II, "ontological predictions" should be non-contextual. We strengthen this requirement further, by requesting that no coarse-grained history that belongs to an allowed CS and has non-zero probability, is contained in a quantum measure zero history.
Probabilistic statements in general are epistemic and correspond to the knowledge an agent has about the system. When a given question Z has quantum measure zero, it implies that this particular question is precluded which is a statement about the physical reality of the system. This means that anything contained in Z, e.g. A ⊆ Z also does not occur, because there is no ontic state compatible with A. It would seem unreasonable for any agent to assign non-zero probability to question A when there is no ontic state that is compatible with A. We would therefore need to rule-out contexts (CSs) that permit this. We now define preclusive consistent sets:
Preclusive Consistent Set (PCS): We call preclusive consistent set, a consistent set C = {A 1 , A 2 , · · · } that for all i such that µ(A i ) = 0, there does not exist any history Z ⊆ Ω with quantum measure zero µ(Z) = 0 such that A i ⊆ Z.
We are now in position to define the set selection criterion that is the main result of this paper. From all CSs we consider as viable, i.e. we maintain in order to reason about the closed quantum system, only the PCSs. We should note here, that one can derive the PCSs directly without needing to obtain all the CSs first. One can easily confirm that among PCSs there are no contrary inferences. This set selection criterion appears to be the weakest criterion that one can introduce in order to avoid contrary inferences. It does not lead to a unique preferred CS but rules out CSs that are not compatible with the ontological predictions of the theory.
It turns out, even though the motivation was somewhat different, that this condition is strictly weaker than the "ordered consistent sets" that Kent proposed [26] . We will comment further on this issue in section IX.
VII. COEVENTS AND PRECLUSIVE CONSISTENT SETS
The interpretation of histories formulations of quantum theory is important. The consistent histories provide a framework to obtain probabilities for histories of a closed quantum system. We have addressed so far the potential inconsistencies within this framework. What it is not typically done in the consistent histories, is a discussion of what is the ontology behind the probabilistic statements. In other words while one can (attempt) to understand the probabilities given by the consistent histories as a state of knowledge of an agent, we have not addressed the issue of what ontic states is the knowledge of this agent about.
The coevents formulation of quantum theory, introduced by Rafael Sorkin [2, 3] attempts to address the issue of which is the ontology of a histories formulation. While this formulation succeeds in circumventing the problems presented by the Kochen Specker theorem [27, 28] and manages to address the problem of ontology in a satisfactory manner, probabilistic predictions are difficult to recover. One is forced to go back at the founders of probability theory and use the (weak) Cournot principle in order to recover probabilistic predictions [30] . An interesting possibility is that one may be able to use the machinery of consistent histories, which provides a full probabilistic calculus, for dealing with probabilistic predictions in the coevents formulation. This will also benefit the consistent histories approach, since it will obtain the underlying ontic states for which the probabilities derived concern. Here we give some brief introduction to the relevant issues of this formulation, while further details can be found in this recent review [4] .
Ideally one would wish to have as possible ontic states of the theory the fine-grained histories. However, due to the existence of zero-covers every fine-grained history can be included at a precluded (quantum measure zero) history. Due to this one needs to consider alternatives for the ontology of the theory and we will use the coevents. A coevent is a (coarse-grained) history R that obeys two basic properties. (i) R is preclusive, i.e. there does not exist Z ∈ Ω where µ(Z) = 0 and R ⊆ Z. (ii) It is minimal, i.e. given a coevent R there does not exist any P ∈ Ω where P is preclusive and R ⊂ P . A coevent is the smallest possible preclusive history. The set of all coevents is the set of all preclusive, minimal histories.
From the very definition of a coevent we can see the following. A history A that belongs to a PCS and has non-zero quantum measure, is a preclusive history. It follows that either A is a coevent, or A contains a coevent. This means that any PCS is compatible with the coevents ontology, since for any epistemic statement that assigns a non-zero probability, there is at least one ontic state (coevent) that is compatible with this.
VIII. EXAMPLES REVISED
We now reexamine the examples in view of the selection criterion brought forward and the potential coevents ontology.
A. Three slit
It easy to confirm that from the three CSs that existed, it is only the third CS that is PCS. In C 1 it is the history {CP } that has non-zero quantum measure and is subset of the quantum measure zero history {BP, CP }. In C 2 it is the history {AP } that has non-zero quantum measure and is subset of the quantum measure zero history {AP, BP }. This is a very special example, where the requirement of PCS leads to unique CS.
There is also a unique allowed coevent in this example (also a very specific feature of this example). This coevent is the history {AP, CP }, since it is a preclusive history and is not contained at any other preclusive history.
B. Two-site hopper
As we have already mentioned, there are no contrary inferences in this example. Furthermore, one can show that all CS of this example are PCS. To see this we should note that to rule out any CS it needs to contain a non-zero history that is subset of a quantum measure zero history. The largest (in terms of cardinality) quantum measure zero history of this example contains four fine-grained histories. One can see that the smallest non-zero history included at any CS contains four fine-grained histories and therefore cannot be subset of any quantum measure zero set. We see that in this example not only we are not lead to a unique CS, but the proposed criterion does not rule out any CS.
This example, also allows for six possible coevents. These are
One can verify that in all CSs, histories that have non-zero quantum measure contain at least one of these six coevents.
IX. DISCUSSION
We have identified as one of the major problems of the consistent histories the fact that the possible contexts (CS) that arise from the formalism allow for contextual ontological predictions. An example of this is the existence of contrary inferences. As it has been argued earlier, when dealing with probability one and probability zero statements (ontological predictions) one should obtain non-contextual truth values and non-contextual inferences. We aimed at restricting the possible CSs, by introducing a set selection criterion. This criterion was that allowed CSs should be preclusive consistent sets. Within the PCSs no contrary inferences exist and moreover the ontological predictions and inferences become non-contextual.
Starting with different motivation, Adrian Kent [26] suggested as criterion that an allowed CS should consist of ordered histories. The quantum measure induces an ordering within the histories. Set inclusion generates a second (partial) ordering of the histories. Kent's proposal was that an ordered history is one that ordering induced by the quantum measure is compatible with the ordering of set inclusion when restricting attention to histories that belong to at least one CS. Then an Ordered Consistent Set (OCS) is a CS that contains only ordered histories. It turns out that OCSs is a strictly stronger condition than PCSs (all OCSs are PCSs but the converse does not hold). The motivation of this criterion is different, since one is interested on full compatibility of the quantum measure with the CSs structure. However, one can point out two remarks relevant with the motivation that we gave in this paper. The first remark is that while we were lead in search for set selection criterion to avoid contextuality of "ontological predictions" Kent's criterion requires a stronger requirement. This can be a positive aspect (it limits further the set of possible CSs), or negative aspect since it may limit the possible contexts further than required. The second remark is that in Kent's criterion, one is restricting attention to histories that belong to CSs to only later further restrict this set to the set of OCS. It turns out that histories that do not belong at any OCS (but belong to some CS) are more important than histories that do not belong at any CS at all. On the other hand, in PCSs one considers all the histories that have quantum measure zero 7 and therefore does not need to use an intermediate step defining all the CSs.
A final issue to analyse, is the connection of PCSs with the coevents formulation. We found in section VII that PCSs are compatible with coevents. It appears that a combination of coevents with consistent histories could be positive to both formulations. On the one hand consistent histories would obtain a possible underlying ontology for which the formalism provides contextual predictions. On the other hand coevents formulation will obtain an alternative way dealing with probabilistic predictions and will be able to benefit from the developed formalism of the consistent histories. Furthermore one could attempt to use more properties of the coevents formulation to restrict the possible CSs further, always in a way compatible with the coevent ontology. In the coevent formulation, one can define a unique finest-grained classical domain, the "principal classical partition" (see appendix of [30] ). Requiring that allowed CSs should arise as a coarse graining of the principal classical partition would give another criterion but we leave the analysis of such a criterion for future work.
